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retention of such bill by the drawee unless its return has been demanded, will
not amount to an acceptance; and provided further that the provisions of
this section shall not apply to checks."
The provisions of § 137 of NIL were eliminated in the UCC. Under
this code, with no exceptions, acceptance must be in writing,14 although
a drawee will be liable to a holder in conversion if the drawee refuses on
demand to return the bill. 20
 Mere retention of an instrument, voluntarily
delivered, without a demand for return, constitutes neither an acceptance
nor a conversion.
KENNETH F. JOYCE
Negotiable Instruments—Stop Payment—Notice to the Payee.—Na-
tional Boulevard Bank of Chicago v. Schwartz)—Plaintiff bank received
a stop payment order from the drawer on a check issued to the defendant.
Drawer sent a similar notice to the defendant payee. Prior to its receipt
the defendant indorsed the check "for deposit only" and deposited it in
his checking account in his own bank. Plaintiff bank negligently cleared
the check for payment and so notified the payee's bank, which on the same
day permitted a withdrawal of substantially all the money represented by
the check. Later the same day after the withdrawal the plaintiff notified
the payee's bank of the mistake. The plaintiff having made the proper
adjustment in the drawer's account brings this action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover the amount
from the payee.2
In granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court
held that where the payee of a check has knowledge that the drawer has
stopped payment, but nevertheless accepts payment made as a result of
the drawee's negligence in clearing the check, the payee is liable to the
drawee on the grounds that under a restrictive indorsement the payee's
bank is only an agent for the purpose of collection. In such a relationship
the knowledge of the payee would preclude him from keeping the money.
A drawer may stop payment of a check prior to certification or pay-
ments Since the check does not operate as an assignment of the drawer's
funds in the bank, the drawee is not liable to the holder prior to acceptance
or certification.4 A drawee who has paid a check after a stop payment
UCC § 3-410.
2u UCC § 3-419.
1 175 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
2 Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
3 UCC § 4-403(1); Beutel, Brannon's Negotiable Instruments Law, § 189 (6th ed.
1938); Britton, Bills and Notes, § 181 (1943); 3 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions 3447
(1944).
4 NIL § 189; UCC § 3-409(0 ; N.Y. Negotiable Instruments Law, § 325; Brady,
Bank Checks, § 10 (2nd ed. 1926) ; 3 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions, 3487 (1944);
Moore, Sussman and Brand, Legal Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment of
Checks, 42 Yale L.J. 817 (1933); 7 Am. Jur., Banks, § 602 (1937).
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order, not only is precluded from charging the drawer's account, but also
from recovering the amount paid to a bona fide holder. 5
The same result does not follow when the payee as a holder has re-
ceived payment after notice of the stop payment order. 5
 The NIL § 88,
states: "Payment is made in due course when it is made at or after the
maturity of the instrument to the holder thereof in good faith and without
notice that his title is defective." 7
 It would seem that as a matter of policy
the payee should not be able to reap the benefits of the bank's mistake when
he has knowledge of the error. He is not harmed in any way since he could
not claim any change in position in reliance upon the bank's payment.
The relation between the payee and the payee's bank is one to be de-
termined by the intention of the parties. 8
 A restrictive indorsement will
preserve title to the paper in the depositor; and in such a case the bank acts
merely as an agent of the depositor for the purpose of collection rather than
becoming a holder in due course.° New York by statute construes an in-
dorsement "for deposit only" as restrictive.' 0 The court in the principal
case decided in accordance with the New York statute and the weight of
authority. 11
 Since the bank is deemed to be a collecting agent under New
York law, it did not become the owner of the note. The payee by virtue of
his knowledge has not the right to retain the money paid to him by his agent.
Allowing the plaintiff in this action to recover restores all parties to
their original position. The drawer has his money, both banks are whole, and
the defendant still has a right of action against the drawer for stopping pay-
ment of the check. It is the drawer who should bear the consequences, if
any, of his stop payment action rather than the drawee bank. In this case
the court followed well established principles in arriving at a just and
equitable determination. LAWRENCE A. KLINGER
5 The Commercial Bank v. L. F, Hall, 266 Ala. 57, 94 So. 2d 198 (1957); First
Nat'l Bank v. Molesky, 15 Ill. App. 2d 470, 146 N.E.2d 707 (1957); Carrot v. South
Carolina National Bank, 211 S.C. 406, 45 S.E.2d 729 (1947); Brady, Bank Checks,
§ 228 (2nd ed. 1926) ; Ogden, Negotiable Instruments, § 283 (5th ed. 1947) ; 3 Paton,
Digest of Legal Opinions 3475 (1944).
First National Bank v. Molesky, supra note 5; Chase Manhattan Bank of City
of New York v. Battat, 297 N.Y. 185, 78 N.E.2d 465 (1951); Smith & McCrorken v.
Chatham Phenix National Bank and Trust Co., 239 App. Div. 318, 267 N.Y.S. 153
(1st Dept. 1933); Murfreesboro Bank and Trust Co. v. Travis, 190 Tenn. 429, 230
S.W.2d 658 (1950); 3 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions 4477 (1944); 9 C.J.S., Banks
and Banking, §§ 344, 354(d) (1938).
7
 Accord: N.Y. Negotiable Instruments Law, § 148; UCC § 3-302.
8
 Martin v. Huber, 68 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup. Ct. 1946); 9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking,
§§ 219, 221(a) (1938).
9 N.Y. Negotiable Instruments Law, § 350(a) ; UCC § 3-206; M. J. Badler v.
Gillarde Sons Co., 387 Pa. 266, 127 A.2d 680 (1956); 2 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions
1253 (1944); 7 Am. Jur., Banks, § 448 (1937); 9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking, § 222(b)
(1938).
10
 N.Y. Negotiable Instruments Law, § 350(c).
11 UCC § 3-205; 2 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions 2111 (1944); 7 Am. Jur., Banks,
§ 448 (1937); 9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking, § 222(b) (1938). But see, Britton, Bills
and Notes, § 70 (1943) which states that in the absence of statutes courts hold that
"for deposit only" is not a restrictive indorsement.
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